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Croll v. Croll: Can Rights of Access
Ever Merit A Remedy of Return
Under the Hague Abduction Convention?
I. Introduction
In this age of globalization, the problem of international child
abduction approaches a critical stage. International custody and
access] cases are expected to become more common as world
travel increases and the divorce rate rises in the decades to come.
According to United States Department of State reports, there are
"about 1,000 open cases of international child abduction at any
given time."3 These abductions "are often complicated by the fact
that many abducted children are from multi-cultural
relationships."'
As an attempt to answer this problem, the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction' (the
Convention) creates a forum among signatories to decide "in
which country custody determinations should be made."6 In the
I Article 5 of the Hague Convention defines parental access as "includ[ing] the
right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual
residence." Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494
(Mar. 26, 1986), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/hague-childabduction.html.
[hereinafter Hague Convention].
2 Sue Pleming, British Envoy's Wife Campaigns For Abducted Kids, REUTERS
ENGLISH NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 4, 2000.
1 Naedine Joy Hazell, New Anti-Abduction Rules on Foreign Travel with Kids,
THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 27, 2000 (quoting Nancy Hammer, director of the international
division of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children). Ms. Hammer did
not note whether the 1,000 open cases involve only United States children or children
from other countries. Id.
4 Concerning Implementation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: Prepared Statement Before the House Committee on
International Relations (1999) (statement of Mary A. Ryan, Assistant Sec'y for Consular
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/101499mar.html
[hereinafter Statement of Mary A. Ryan].
I Hague Convention, supra note 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98.
6 Statement of Mary A. Ryan, supra note 4.
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first ten years that the United States has been a signatory,7 over
2,000 children have been returned to the United States as a result
of Hague Convention proceedings! Nine countries were parties to
the Hague Convention when the United States joined in 1988 and,
as of August 1, 2000, that number has increased to over sixty.9
The Hague Convention proceedings, however, have not
resulted in success for every left-behind parent.' Some
impediments to the Convention's effectiveness include: varied
implementation among foreign jurisdictions-including non-
compliance among signatory countries;" difficulty locating
children; slow processing of return cases;2 non-enforcement of
return orders in civil law countries; judicial consideration of young
7 The United States signed the Hague Abduction Convention on December 23,
1981. See Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, to President
Ronald Reagan (Oct. 4, 1985), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,496 (Mar. 26, 1986)
[hereinafter Letter of Submittal].
8Id.
9 Id. The following countries were signatories to the Convention as of August 1,
2000: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China (Hong Kong and Macau
Administrative Regions only), Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
Hague Conference on Private International Law: Status Sheet Convention #28, available
at http://www.hcch.net/e/status/abdshte.html (last modified Nov. 7, 2000).
10 See Statement of Mary A. Ryan, supra note 4. "Left behind parent" refers to the
parent who is seeking the return of an abducted child.
I Ild. Currently, Austria, Honduras, Mauritius, Mexico and Sweden "have
demonstrated a pattern of noncompliance" with Hague Convention application
obligations for the return of American children. Id. Reasons for noncompliance vary. For
example, the Honduran government claims that it "is not bound by the Convention due
to an error in its domestic ratification process" and, therefore, "take[s] no action on
applications filed by left-behind parents for the return of children in Honduras." Id.
However, "Austria was found noncompliant due to an apparent lack of understanding in
the Austrian judiciary about the aims of the Convention." Id.
12 Id. The courts of some countries do not process cases in a timely manner despite
Article lI's call for an "expeditious processing of return cases." Id. Article 11 "specifies
that courts may be asked the reason for delay if they have not decided a Hague case
within six weeks." Id. (citing Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 6-7, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100).
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children's consent; and extensive undertakings required of the left-
behind parent. 3 Despite its imperfections, one way to measure the
value of the Hague Convention to the United States is the
approximately "72 percent of cases [that] result in [the] return [of]
or access" to children to the United States today, as opposed to the
"approximately 20 percent" of abducted children returned before
the United States became a Convention signatory. 4
In deciding whether the abducted child should be returned to
the non-abducting parent, courts in signatory nations must
determine which parent exercised rights of custody as defined by
the Hague Convention. Under the Convention, only a parent with
rights of custody can petition for return of their child. In Croll v.
Croll,'6 the Second Circuit ruled that a parent holding "rights of
access" to the child combined with a non-removal clause 7 in the
custody order does not hold rights of custody under the Hague
Convention. By their ruling, the court significantly narrowed the
definition of custody rights and, consequently, who can exercise
them."
This Note reviews the facts and holding of Croll v. Croll in
Part 11.20 The historical evolution of the two major viewpoints on
rights of custody and rights of access is examined in Part III,21
while the Second Circuit's majority and dissenting opinions are
analyzed in Part IV.2 Finally, this Note concludes that the Second
Circuit's decision is inconsistent with the object and purpose of
the Hague Convention as well as the relevant U.S. and foreign
case law. 3
13 Statement of Mary A. Ryan, supra note 4.
14 Id.
'1 Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Croll I1].
16 Id. at 137.
17 A non-removal clause in a custody order specifies that the custodial parent may
not remove the child from the country of habitual habitation without the other parent's
permission (also called a ne exeat clause by the Croll court). Id. at 135 n.1.
18 Id. at 137.
19 Id. at 143.
20 See infra notes 24-71 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 72-141 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 142-200 and accompanying text.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 142-201.
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H. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Stephen and Mei Yee Croll, both United States citizens, were
married in Hong Kong in 1982.2 Their daughter Christina was
born in 1990.2" She lived with both her parents until their
separation in 1998.26 After the separation, Christina lived in Hong
Kong with her mother, while her father, who lived in Hong Kong
as well, visited her regularly." Divorce proceedings were initiated
by Mr. Croll in 1998 in the District Court of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, Matrimonial Causes.2 1 Ms. Croll
did not take part in the divorce proceedings.29 In the February 1999
custody order,3" the Hong Kong Court granted Ms. Croll "custody,
care and control" and Mr. Croll "reasonable access."3 The custody
order was "to become final in six weeks unless cause was shown
otherw ise.
'3 2
In April of 1999, Ms. Croll took Christina to New York.
During an evidentiary hearing in District Court, she initially
24 Croll v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Croll 1].
25 Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 135.
26 Croll 1, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
27 Id. The meaning of "regularly" was disputed between the parties. Mr. Croll
claimed to have visited Christina two to three times weekly "and accompan[ied] her to
after-school activities," while Ms. Croll claimed that he "saw Christina approximately
two times each month." Id.
28 Croll H, 229 F.3d at 135.
29 Id. The Crolls disputed "whether Ms. Croll ... received legally sufficient notice
of their pendency." Croll 1, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
30 Id. The order directed that Christina
[Ble not removed from Hong Kong without leave until she attains the age of 18
years but provided that if either parent to [sic] give a general undertaking to the
Court to return the said child to Hong Kong when called upon to do so, and
unless otherwise directed with the written consent of the other parent, that
parent may remove the said child from Hong Kong for any period specified in
such written consent.
Id.
31 Id. (quoting Croll v. Chiu, No. 7211 of 1998, Order at 2 (Dist. Ct. H.K. Spec.
Admin. Reg., Feb. 23, 1999)).
32 Id.
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claimed the removal was with Mr. Croll's consent,33 but later
admitted that she intended to make New York Christina's place of
residence." Mr. Croll testified that after he returned to Hong Kong
from a business trip on April 7, 1999, he discovered that Christina
was not at her school or at the apartment she shared with her
mother.35 He filed a missing person report with the Hong Kong
police.36 Soon thereafter, he retained counsel in the United States
and filed an application pursuant to the Hague Convention." Upon
her arrival in America, Ms. Croll filed for custody, child support,
and an order of protection in the Family Court of New York
County on April 8, 1999.38
B. United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York
In June of 1999, Mr. Croll applied to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York for Christina's return
to her habitual residence of Hong Kong pursuant to the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction.39 Ms. Croll moved to dismiss the petition on the
grounds that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
and that the petition failed to state a claim under which relief could
be granted."° Judge Sidney Stein found these grounds to be too
insubstantial to dismiss the petition and ordered Christina's return
to Hong Kong."
13 Id. Ms. Croll testified at the evidentiary hearing for the district court trial "that
Mr. Croll had previously consented to her relocating to the United States with Christina."
Id. Mr. Croll conceded "that he and his ex-wife did discuss this possibility before they
separated, but denied giving actual consent." Id.
34 Croll II, 229 F.3d at 135. According to a non-removal clause in the order, either
parent could request that the Hong Kong immigration department refuse to issue
Christina a passport without the other parent's consent. Croll I, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
35 Croll 1, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
36 Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 135.
37 Croll I, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
38 Id. at 558.
39 Id.
40 Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 135.
41 Croll 1, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 556. According to the court, its duty under the Hague
Convention was to determine whether the child was wrongfully removed from "her
habitual residence within the meaning of the Convention and.., to order ... [her return]
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Mr. Croll, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that Christina was "wrongfully
removed or retained" within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague
Convention. 2 Judge Stein found that Mr. Croll met this burden. 3
Ms. Croll's defenses to the repatriation order were: (1) non-
exercise of right of custody at time of removal," (2) consent,4" and
to Hong Kong unless certain narrowly-defined exceptions were present." Blondin v.
Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1999). The first two exceptions "may be
established only by 'clear and convincing evidence"' while the last two "need only be
established by a preponderance of the evidence." See infra notes 87-91 and
accompanying text.
42 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4-5, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 98-99. Article 3 reads:
A removal or retention is "wrongful" if "(a) it is in breach of rights of custody
attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone,
under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before the removal or retention; and (b) at the time of removal or
retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would
have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
43 Croll II, 229 F.3d at 136. First, Christina's habitual residency was not disputed
because she had lived in Hong Kong since her birth. Second, under the Hague
Convention a court determines "whether a parent was exercising lawful custody rights
over a child at the time of removal" by looking to "the law of the child's habitual
residence." Croll 1, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 559. Judge Stein found that the right to determine
residency is "tantamount to a 'right of custody' within the meaning of the Convention."
Id. Precedent for his decision rested in the holdings of several courts that non-removal
clauses "vest[ ] the non-custodial parent with a 'right of custody' within the meaning of
the Convention." Id.
44 Croll I, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 560. First, Ms. Croll claimed Mr. Croll was not
exercising his custody rights at the time she removed the child from Hong Kong because
his visits were so infrequent as to be characterized as abandonment. Id. The court said
that regardless of how often he was said to visit, he did visit and so "was exercising his
right of custody at the time that Christina was removed from Hong Kong." Id.; see also
Sampson v. Sampson, 975 P.2d 1211, 1217 (Kan. 1999) (finding that "[t]he only
acceptable solution, in the absence of a ruling from a court in the country of habitual
residence, is to liberally find 'exercise' [of custody rights] whenever a parent with de
jure custody rights keeps, or seeks to keep, any sort of regular contact with his or her
child").
41 Croll 1, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 560. Ms. Croll argued two factors as the basis of a
consent claim. Id. Mr. Croll impliedly gave his consent to Christina's removal by not
exercising his "right under the Hong Kong interim order to request that the immigration
department not issue Christina a passport without his consent." Id. Judge Stein did not
find that Mr. Croll gave his implied consent by not contacting the immigration
department because Mr. Croll did not believe, at that time, that Ms. Croll would take
Christina out of the country permanently. Id. Ms. Croll also argued that, prior to
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(3) grave risk of harm exception. 6 Judge Stein concluded,
however, that Christina should be returned to Hong Kong pursuant
to the Hague Convention because her removal was wrongful and
none of the exceptions applied. 7
separating, the parties had discussed the beneficial effect that relocating would have on
Christina. Id. at 561. The court did not find that these "casual discussions" constituted
consent on Mr. Croll's part to her removal. id. This is especially true in light of the fact
that he filed his petition for Christina's return under the Hague Convention a few weeks
after she left Hong Kong. id.
46 Id. at 560. According to the court, all exceptions should be narrowly construed
so as not "to frustrate the objectives of the Convention." Id. A systematic invocation of
the exceptions by substituting the forum of the child's habitual residence for that chosen
by the abductor "would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the Convention by
depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its inspiration." Elisa Perez-Vera,
Explanatory Report: Hague Conference on Private International Law, in ACTS AND
DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 426, 434-35, 34 (1980) [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report]. Ms.
Croll invoked the grave risk exception in Article 13(b) of the Convention as a defense.
Croll I, F. Supp. 2d at 561 (providing that if "there is a grave risk that [the child's] return
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in
an intolerable situation," that the "child need not be returned to the country where the
child is habitually resident") See infra note 89 and accompanying text. The court found
that the 13(b) exception did not apply for two reasons. First, Hong Kong is not a "zone
of war, famine or disease." Croll I, F. Supp. 2d at 561.
[Tihe Article 13(b) exception applies only when "return of the child puts the
child in imminent danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute-e.g.,
returning the child to a zone of war, famine, or disease [or when there has been]
serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence [and] the court
in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or
unwilling to give the child adequate protection."
Id. (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986)). Second, incidents of Mr. Croll's alleged
rough treatment of Ms. Croll not only were not witnessed by Christina, but did not put
her in danger nor were they reported to the police. Id. Ms. Croll, therefore, did not meet
the clear and convincing evidence burden necessary to prove this exception. Id. at 562.
The court added that Ms. Croll offered "no evidence to demonstrate that the Hong Kong
courts would be incapable or unwilling to protect Christina adequately should she be in
danger of being placed in a situation where she was at risk." Id.
47 Id. at 562. Because the parties were unable to agree to a certain undertaking as
requested by the court, the court conditioned "Christina's return to Hong Kong" on the
following undertakings:
(1) Mr. Croll shall pay the US $1,000 support for Christina each month pursuant
to the ex parte order of the Hong Kong court dated May 3, 1999; (2) Mr. Croll
shall pay for airline tickets to Hong Kong for Mei Yee Croll and for Christina;
and (3) Mr. Croll shall pay tuition and fees for the current academic year for the
school that Christina attended during the 1998-1999 academic year.
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C. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
The district court's order of return was stayed pending Ms.
Croll's expedited appeal to the United States District Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit."
1. Majority Opinion
In Judge Jacobs' majority opinion, the outcome of the case
hinged on the precise distinction between rights of custody and
rights of access under the Hague Convention. 9 The question
specifically before the court was "whether rights of access coupled
with a ne exeat ° clause confer 'custodial rights' on a non-custodial
parent within the meaning of the Hague Convention."" The court
held that such a clause "does not transmute access rights into
rights of custody." 2 In analyzing the Hague Convention, the court
explained that a treaty should be construed like a statute by "first
look[ing] to its terms to determine its meaning."53
The court then looked to exact wording of the Convention to
determine the meaning of custody-ultimately concluding that the
id.
41 Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 136. The court heard oral arguments on February 22, 2000.
41 Id. If Mr. Croll had rights of custody, then "courts in the United States have
jurisdiction to order ... [the child's] return to Hong Kong... and the duty to do so." Id.
If he had "the lesser rights of access, [however,] jurisdiction is lacking and Mr. Croll
must rely on other remedies." Id.
S0 A ne exeat clause is defined as "[a] writ which forbids the person to whom it is
addressed to leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the court." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 1990); see also supra note 17.
5' Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 136.
52 Id. at 143.
53 Id. at 136 (quoting U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 633 (1992)). Thus,
Judge Jacobs first looked to the Hague Convention's purpose "to protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to
establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence,
as well as to secure protection for rights of access." Id. at 137 (quoting Hague
Convention, supra note 1, Preamble). He agreed that the Hague Convention set forth as a
guiding principle that the child's country of "habitual residence" is the "best place to
decide 'questions of custody and access."' Id. at 137 (quoting Perez-Vera Report, supra
note 45, 34). However, Judge Jacobs noted that a remedy of return is available "only
for wrongful removals or retentions" and a removal or retention of a child is only
wrongful when exercised against the parent with rights of custody. Id. at 137. Therefore,
under the Convention, the determinination of where rights of custody lie would answer
whether a remedy of return is allowed. Id.
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language did not include rights of access within that meaning."
Mr. Croll argued that the Hague Convention's definition of
custody contemplated those parents with rights of access.5 The
court, however, found Mr. Croll's argument unpersuasive. 6 Judge
Jacobs reasoned that the power to determine a child's place of
residence is distinguishable from a ne exeat clause because it is
part of "an example of the powers, choices and arrangements
entailed by the care of the child" that is part of the Hague
Convention's definition of custody. 7 Another concern of the court
in enforcing ne exeat clauses by a mandatory return of the child
was the result of a child returning alone "to a parent whose sole
right-to visit or veto-impose[d] no duty to give care."58
54 Id. at 138. The court used several American dictionaries to create an
amalgamated definition that custody entails "the primary duty and ability to choose and
give sustenance, shelter, clothing, moral and spiritual guidance, medical attention,
education, etc., or the (revocable) selection of other people or institutions to give these
things." Id. The court stated that this was the definition of custody intended by the
Convention drafters. Id. at 139. Article 5 defines "rights of custody" generally as "rights
relating to the care of the person of the child." Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99.
11 Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 139. The Hague Convention's definition of custody includes
"in particular, the right to determine a child's place of residence," which pertains to the
right to veto a child's removal from his habitual residence that a parent is granted in a ne
exeat clause of a custody order. Id. (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99). Judge Jacobs reasoned that a right of
custody protected by the Convention and meriting a return remedy is created in a non-
custodial parent by the ne exeat clause, and thus gives that parent a "right to determine
the child's place of residence." Id. at 139.
56 Id. First, the court interpreted the ne exeat clause to convey only a veto power
over Christina's expatriation, but not a "say over any other custodial issue, including
Christina's 'place of residence' within Hong Kong." Id. Thus, no "joint right to
determine the child's residence [is conferred] particularly since an earlier clause in the
custody order awards 'custody care and control' solely to the mother." Id. Second, the
court reasoned that Mr. Croll cannot be said to have complied with Article 3(b) because
"[t]he right conferred by the ne exeat clause is not one that Mr. Croll 'actually
exercised."' Id. at 140. It is circular reasoning, according to the court, to claim that he
would have exercised the right if Christina had not been removed "because the right
itself concerns nothing but removal itself, and would never have been exercised had Mrs.
Croll been content to stay in Hong Kong during Christina's minority." Id.
57 Id. at 140. This is to be distinguished from a "ne exeat clause [which] confers
only a veto, a power in reserve, that gives the non-custodial parent no say (except by
leverage) about any child-rearing issue other than the child's geographical location in the
broadest sense." Id.
58 Id. This would violate the "foundational assumption in the Convention... that
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The court found additional support for its interpretation of
"rights of custody" in the writings of the Hague Conference
Commission chair, 9 two accounts by the official reporter of the
Hague Conference,6 ° and the report of Secretary of State George P.
Schultz upon his submission of the Convention to President
Reagan.6'
Mr. Croll argued that there was "a distinction between: (i) a
bare right of access, recognized as such; and (ii) the same bare
right of access enforced by a ne exeat clause. 6 2 The court
the remedy of return will deliver the child to a custodial parent who (by definition) will
receive and care for the child." Id. The court therefore says it "cannot plausibly read the
Convention to compel the removal of a child from a parent who exercises all rights of
care to a country in which no one has that affirmative power or duty." Id. The court
found that Mr. Croll could not sustain his "burden of showing that the Hong Kong
custody decree affirmatively granted him shared or partial custody in some normal sense
of the word." Id. at 141.
59 Id.
[T]he sole power to bar exit does not amount to the custodial bundle of rights
because "breach of a right simply to give or to withhold consent to changes in a
child's place of residence is not to be construed as a breach of rights of custody
in the sense of Article 3. A suggestion that the definition of 'abduction' should
be widened to cover this case was not pursued."
A.E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 537, 546 (1981). The Croll majority said:
[T]he Convention provides separate remedies to secure access rights versus
custodial rights, and limits the return remedy to the breach of custody: "A
questionable result would [be] attained had the application of the Convention,
by granting the same degree of protection to custody and access rights, led
ultimately to the substitution of the holders of one type of right by those who
held the other."
Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 142 (quoting the Perez-Vera Report, supra note 46, 65).
60 Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 142.
[A]lthough the problems which can arise from a breach of access rights,
especially where the child is taken abroad by its custodian, were raised ... the
majority view was that such situations could not be put in the same category as
the wrongful removals which [the Hague Convention] is sought to prevent.
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 46, T 65.
61 Croll H, 229 F.3d at 142 (reporting that "'the remedies for breach of the "access
rights" of the noncustodial parent do not include the return remedy.' ... The Secretary's
view of the matter is entitled to 'great weight."').
62 Id. He reasoned that when access rights are coupled with an enforcing ne exeat
clause, a return remedy "is needed to achieve the Convention's goal of preventing
parents from unilaterally circumventing the home country's courts in search of a more
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disagreed because it believed that ne exeat clauses "protect[]
parental rights of access or custody alike; [they do] not transmute
one right into the other.
63
2. Dissent
Judge Sotomayer felt the issue was "whether the ne exeat
clause-wholly independent of Mr. Croll's access rights-confers
'rights of custody' under the Convention."' He believed the
majority's mischaracterization of the issue as a ne exeat clause
"transmut[ing] access rights into custody rights under the
Convention ' 61 seriously undermined "the Convention's goal of
'ensuring that rights of custody . . . under the law of one
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting
States.""'6 The dissent concluded that Christina's removal was "in
breach of rights of custody" that were actually exercised when
Christina was removed from Hong Kong.67
sympathetic forum" and thus "frustrating the ne exeat clause altogether." Id.
63 Id. The result would be an "overlooking [of] the stated intentions of the drafters"
and "amending judicially the Convention's explicit textual distinction between rights of
custody and rights of access." Id.; see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122,
135 (1989) ("[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether
small or great, important or trivial, would be on part an usurpation of power, and not an
exercise of judicial function." (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 5 L. Ed. 191 (1821))).
Courts must construe, not make, treaties. Id.
64 Croll H, 229 F.3d at 144 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 145 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Croll II, 229 F.3d at 143).
66 Id. at 144 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 1,
art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98). Judge Sotomayer saw a
requirement to look "beyond parochial definitions to the broader meaning of an
international treaty." Id. at 145. Assessing the ordinary meaning of treaty terms must be
done "in their context and in the light of [the Hague Convention's] object and purpose."
Id. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, art. 31.1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (stating general rule on the interpretation of
treaties)). He found that "the Convention plainly favors 'a flexible interpretation of the
terms used, which allows the greatest possible number of cases to be brought into
consideration."' Id. at 146 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Perez-Vera Report, supra
note 46, 67). This purpose was effectuated by an inclusive rather than exclusive intent
in the Hague Convention drafting. Id. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). An inclusive intent can
be read in the Hague Convention report itself that "the intention [of the Hague
Convention] is to protect all the ways in which custody of children can be exercised." Id.
(Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Perez-Vera Report, supra note 45, 79).
67 Id. at 144 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). In addition, Article 3 "provides that 'fights
of custody' may arise from a variety of sources, including by 'operation of law or by
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 26
Specifically, Judge Sotomayer determined that the ne exeat
clause vested "both Mr. Croll and the Hong Kong court with
'rights of custody"' under the Hague Convention because it
"provides a parent with decisionmaking authority regarding a
child's international relocation"6 by its inclusion of "the right to
determine the child's place of residence."69 Judge Sotomayer also
cited foreign case law to support his notion that "'rights of
custody' [should be interpreted] broadly in light of the
Convention's purpose and structure."7 Thus, the dissent found that
"Article 3(b)... pose[d] no barrier to finding that Christina's
removal was wrongful under the Convention. 7'
reason of ajudicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal
effect under the law"' of the child's country of habitual residence. Id. at 146 (Sotomayer,
J., dissenting) (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at4-
5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98-99). The drafters of the Hague Convention did "not generally
define [the treaty's] legal term" but they included Article 5 because of "the risk that 'an
incorrect interpretation of [custody and access rights] would.., compromise the
Convention's objects."' Id. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Perez-Vera Report,
supra note 46, 83). Article 5 "offers further guidance on the meaning of the term
'rights of custody."' Id. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (citing Perez-Vera Report, supra note
46, 1 83).
68 Id. at 146 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
69 Id. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99). Given the Hague Convention's broad
purpose, the concept of "wrongful removal" in Article 3 "clearly must encompass
violations of ne exeat rights" because when a custodial parent removes a child from the
country of habitual residence in violation of ne exeat rights, "she nullifies that country's
custody law as effectively as does the parent who kidnaps a child in violation of the
rights of the parent with physical custody of that child." Id. at 147 (Sotomayer, J.,
dissenting). When the Hague Convention is read "so narrowly as to exclude the return
remedy" after a removing parent "seeks a custody order in the new country ...to
legitimize" the removal of the child, then "such a situation would allow ... parents to
undermine the very purpose of the Convention." Id. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 150. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). He believed that Mr. Croll would have
actually exercised his right of authority in the ne exeat clause "to withhold or grant
consent to removing Christina from Hong Kong" if not "for Christina's unlawful
removal." Id. at 153 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
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HI. Background Law
A. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction
Adopted by signatory nations in 1980, the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction has
attempted to provide a solution to the growing problem of
international custody battles.72 The Hague Convention's purpose is
"to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of
their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to
ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence,
as well as to secure protection for rights of access."73 The Hague
Convention was signed by the United States on December 23,
1981, 7 ratified on October 9, 1986,"5 and implemented in the
United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act.1
6
Only children who are habitual residents of signatory nations
and under 16 years of age before their abduction are covered under
the Hague Convention.77 Signatory nations must designate a
central authority "to discharge the duties which are imposed by the
Convention."78 Applications for the return of children are directed
to these central authorities.79 In the United States, the central
authority is the Office of Children's Issues in the Bureau of
72 Hague Convention, supra note 1, Preamble, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 98.
73 Id. These purposes are achieved "by returning the child to the parent or custodian
with whom the child was residing prior to the abduction, regardless of the existence of a
custody or visitation decree obtained by the abducting parent." Stephanie Vullo, The
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International child Abduction: Commencing a
Proceeding in New York for the Return of a Child Abducted from a Foreign Nation, 14
TouRo L. REV. 199, 201 (1997).
74 Letter of Submittal, supra note 7.
75 INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS: A GUIDE TO APPLYING THE HAGUE
CONVENTION, WITH FORMS 14 (Gloria F. DeHart ed., 2d ed. 1993).
76 The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat.
437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1988)) [hereinafter ICARA].
77 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S.
at 99.
78 Id. art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99.
79 Id. art. 8, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 6-7, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100.
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Consular Affairs in the Department of State.8" After a petition is
filed with a central authority, the agency will help locate the
abducted child and then forward the petition to the nation from
which the child was abducted.8'
Courts hearing Hague Convention cases conduct a narrow
inquiry into the wrongfulness of the abduction and apply a two-
part test to the claims." The first part requires that the removal be
"in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution
or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the
State in which the child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention."83 The second part requires that
"those rights [of custody] ... [must have been] actually exercised,
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the
removal or retention" at the time the abduction occurred." The
burden of proving that custody rights were not actually exercised
at the time of the removal or retention, or that the applicant had
consented to or acquiesced in the removal or retention, rests on the
person opposing the return.8" Hague Convention drafters point out
"that proof that custody was not actually exercised does not form
an exception to the duty to return if the dispossessed guardian was
unable to exercise his rights precisely because of the action of the
abductor.' 86
If one of the following four exceptions can be proved,
however, the child's return is not mandatory even if the removal
was wrongful.87 First, if "the person, institution or other body [who
80 Exec. Order No. 12,648, 3 C.F.R. 579 (1988), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 11606
(1988). The State Department's role is limited to providing assistance in locating the
child; it cannot act "as an agent or attorney or in any fiduciary capacity in legal
proceedings arising under the Convention" and "is not responsible for the costs of any
legal representation or legal proceedings nor for any transportation expenses of the child
or applicant." International Child Abduction, 22 C.F.R. § 94.4 (1998); see also Vullo,
supra note 73, at 206.
81 Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8-9, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 6-7, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 100.
82 Id.
83 Id. art. 8, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 6-7, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100.
84 Id.
85 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 46, 1 115.
86 Id.
87 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 1343
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cared for the] child was not actually exercising the custody rights
at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention," the child
need not be returned.8" Second, if "there is a grave risk that [the
child's] return would expose [him] to physical or psychological
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation," he is
not required to be returned. 9 Third, if the child's return would not
be permitted by "the fundamental principles of the requested State
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms," then such a return is not warranted.9" Finally, if the
return proceeding began more than one year after the wrongful
removal and "the child is now settled in its new environment," the
child does not have to be returned.9'
Judicial and administrative authorities are empowered by the
Hague Convention to take "into account the information relating
to the social background of the child provided by the Central
Authority or other competent authority of the child's habitual
residence."92 Judicial or administrative authorities may "refuse to
order the return of [a] child if [they] find[ ] that the child objects to
being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at
which it is appropriate to take account of its views."93
B. United States Case Law
The cases in the following section illustrate the range of
interpretations attributed to rights of custody and rights of access
under the Hague Convention among United States courts. In the
1991 New York state court case of David S. v. Zamira S.,94 the
court found that the mother had wrongfully removed her child
U.N.T.S. at 101.
88 Id. art. 13(a), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
89 Id. art. 13(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
90 Id. art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 9, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. This public policy
exception "could be invoked on the rare occasion that return of a child would utterly
shock the conscience of the court or offend all notions of due process." Id.
91 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 7-8, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 100.
92 Id. art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
93 Id.
94 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1991).
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from Canada despite a Canadian court separation agreement
giving the mother full custody-but with the proviso that she not
leave Toronto-and giving the father visitation of the child.9"
Although the court recognized that a right of custody was created
in the father pursuant to the non-removal clause, the court
remarked in dicta that the mother's argument that such a right
should not be created "might have some merit but for the
respondent's contemptuous conduct, and the subsequent orders of
the Supreme Court of Ontario which give temporary custody of
both children to the petitioner.
9 6
Viragh v. Foldes97 was the first United States case to
specifically address the protection of access rights.98 The
Massachusetts court heard an argument that 'rights of custody' are
broadly defined under the Convention and thus a parent with rights
of access could have "rights of custody under [a foreign] law
which [could be] violated by the wrongful retention of... children
in the United States."99 After considering the foreign law and
finding it inapplicable, the court explained that "the Convention
clearly distinguishes between mandatory return due to
wrongful removal or retention under Article 3, and discretionary
return under Article 1 8."'" Moreover, the court determined that the
Hague Convention does not provide specific remedies for rights of
access violations.'' The court concluded instead that "the parent
who has removed the children from their habitual residence, and
made the exercise of access rights more difficult, may be ordered
95 Id. at 432.
96 Id.
97 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993).
98 Eric S. Horstmeyer, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child
Abduction: An Analysis of Tahan and Viragh and Their Impact on Its Efficacy, 33 U.
LoUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 125, 134 (1995).
99 Viragh, 612 N.E.2d at 247. The argument was based on "Article 3 [which]
provides that determination whether the party who has requested mandatory return is
indeed vested with rights of custody should be based on the 'law of the State in which
the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention."' Id. As
support for his claim, the father cited a ruling by the Civil College of the Supreme Court
of Hungary, which "applies the family law of Hungary to the terms of the Convention to
establish the boundaries of wrongful removal and retention under Hungarian law." Id. at
248.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 247.
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to pay the necessary expenses incurred by the noncustodial parent
effectively to exercise rights of access."' 1
2
The recent Kentucky Court of Appeals case of Janakakis-
Kostun v. Janakakis1°3 upheld a Greek court order for return of a
child wrongfully removed by her mother from Greece."° Despite
the attachment to the mother's temporary custody order of an
order prohibiting removal of the child from Greece, the mother
brought the child into the United States in violation of the father's
visitation rights. 5 The father was awarded custody by the Greek
court after the mother left with the child, but even if he had still
held visitation rights, the court cites David S. for the proposition
that: (1) "[v]isitation rights alone ... have been held to fall within
the meaning of 'custodial right,""' and (2) even when they do not
equal custody rights, "such a distinction was meritless where a
respondent, i.e., the removing parent, engaged in 'contemptuous
conduct' in removing the child from its habitual residence.""1 7
C. International Case Law
Foreign signatory case law is divided into two competing
interpretations of rights of custody and rights of access under the
Hague Convention. The evolution of these interpretations is traced
in this section.
The expansive view of rights of custody was set forth in the
precedential English Court of Appeals decision of C. v. C.'°8
According to an Australian custody order, both parents were joint
guardians and "[n]either ... shall remove the child from Australia
without the consent of the other."'0 9 Thereafter, the father obtained
(from an Australian court) a transfer of custody of the child to
102 Id. at 249 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99).
103 Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843 (Ky. App. 1999).
104 Id. at 849.
105 Id. at 846.
106 Id. at 849 (citing David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y. Fan. Ct.
1991)).
107 Id.
108 1 W.L.R. 654 (1989) (Eng. C.A.).
109 Id. at 656.
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himself with no rights of access in the mother." ' In a unanimous
decision, the court determined that the Article 5 words-"'rights
of custody' shall include ... in particular, the right to determine
the child's place of residence..."- should be read into Article
3's understanding of when a child's removal would be wrongful
"and may in certain circumstances extend the concept of custody
beyond the ordinarily understood domestic approach."...
The 1991 Australian case of In the Marriage of.- Jose Garcia
Resina Appellant/Husband and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Resina
Respondent/Wife.2 was influenced by the precedent of C. v. C.13 in
deciding an appeal under the Hague Convention from a father who
sought the return of his children from France."' Of the two
children of concern in the appeal, the court specifically discussed
what rights of custody the father had in the child who was his by
marriage to the child's mother."5 The custody order issued by the
Australian court gave the mother custody of the child, the father
"reasonable access" and, in addition, contained "an injunction...
restraining each of the parties from removing either of the children
from ... the Commonwealth of Australia.""' 6 The court found that
an injunction restricting a child from leaving the country without
the parent's agreement is a "right of custody" which would form
110 Id.
M Id. at 658. Because the court ruled that the removal of the child was wrongful
under Article 3, the mother must "rely on the Australian courts for a decision as to the
future home of the child." Id. at 661. The court explained that due to the international
character of the Hague Convention, the Australian or English law definition of rights of
custody was irrelevant--only the Hague Convention Article 5 definition mattered. Id. at
663.
112 In the Marriage of: Jose Garcia Resina Appellant/Husband and Muriel Ghislaine
Henriette Resina Respondent/Wife, Appeal No. 52, 1991 (Austl. Fam.).
113 Id. 18. C. v. C. was so influential that a justice said that without the judgment
of that case "it would not have been likely that one would have concluded that an
injunction of the type which was relevant there and which is relevant here would have
been understood in Australian domestic law as conferring rights of guardianship or
custody." Id. 20. The justice went on to say that when he first read the C. v. C. opinion
he "thought it amounted to something of a quantum leap from what had hitherto been the
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the basis for a wrongful removal."7
However, the 1992 French court case of Ministere Public v.
Mme Y"8 took a different view."9 Although the mother was granted
custodial rights by an English court "under the condition that she
remain in England or Wales," she took the child to France.'20 The
holding of the French court indicated "that the removal was not
wrongful because custody rights were not violated and the
removal only interfered with the father's rights of access and
visitation." '' 2
During the same year, an Israeli appeals court took the
opposite view. The 1992 case of Pnina Turna v. Daniel Charles
Meshullam 22 was the "first case that arose under the Convention in
Israel."'2 3 The Supreme Court of Israel heard an application for
return from a father whose "French divorce decree provided for
joint custody.' 2' The court found that the mother's removal of "the
child to Israel without the father's knowledge or consent ... was
both a 'wrongful removal' in violation of the father's rights of
custody and a denial of the father's visiting rights.' 25 Similarly, in
Foxman v. Foxman"6 the High Court of the Civil Appeals Court of
17 Id. 23. The court reached this conclusion because (1) uniformity of law
between common law countries was found "highly desirable," and (2) this result
conformed with the Hague Convention's spirit of ensuring that "children who are taken
from one country to another wrongfully, in the sense of in breach of court orders or
understood legal rights, are promptly returned to their country so that their future can
properly be determined within that society." id. [ 26.
"1 Ministere Public v. Mme Y, T.G.I. Perigueux (Mar. 17, 1992) (discussed in
Silberman, infra note 119, at 18).
"19 See Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A
Brief Overview and Case Law Analysis, 28 FAM. L.Q. 9, 18 (1994).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 C.A. 1648/92, Pnina Turna v. Daniel Charles Meshullam (1992) (S. Ct. Isr.)
(cited in Bailey, infra note 123, at 297-98. This case was referred to in Croll v. Croll as
"Tourna v. Meshulem." Croll II, 229 F.3d at 151)).
123 Martha Bailey, The Right of a Non-Custodial Parent to an Orderfor Return of a
Child Under the Hague Convention, 13 CAN. J. FAM. L. 287, 297 (1996).
124 Silberman, supra note 119, at 18.
2I Bailey, supra note 123, at 298.
126 C.A. 527/92, Foxman v. Foxman (1992) (H.C. Isr.) (1992) (discussed in Martha
Bailey, "Rights of Custody" Under the Hague Convention, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 33, 39
n.21 (1997)).
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Israel decided that a consultation clause contained in the parent's
first custody/access agreement-which included a provision for
mutual consultation on major changes or unusual events-"was
implicitly included in the revised agreement, and concluded that
the father had rights of custody within the meaning of the
Convention.
27
In the 1993 case of B. v B.,128 the English Court of Appeal
unanimously overturned a lower court ruling that a mother did not
wrongfully remove a child under the Hague Convention.' 29 Before
the mother took the child to England, a Canadian court had
granted the father interim rights of access and the mother interim
custody, pending a trial.'3° The Court of Appeal found the mother's
removal to be unlawful because the Canadian court itself,
"[h]aving made what is no more than an interim custody order,"' 3'
"had a right of custody at this time in the sense that it had the right
to determine the child's place of residence, and it was in breach of
that right that the mother removed the child from its place of
habitual residence.' ' 3
2
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada was confronted with its
first Hague Convention case-Thomson v. Thomson.3 3 This
leading case marked a shift away from the previous broad
interpretations of the Convention's definition of rights of
custody/rights of access and towards a more narrow definition. In
Thomson, a Scottish court issued "an interim custody order that
included a non-removal clause" to a mother immediately before
127 Id.
128 B. v. B., 2 All. E.R. 144 (1993) (Eng. C.A.).
129 Id. at 153.
130 Id. at 146.
3' Id. at 153.
132 Id. at 149. The court found that this case was
[A]n example of just such an abduction as the Convention was designed to
combat. In those circumstances we have no alternative but to adopt the course
dictated by the Convention and order the child's return to Canada forthwith so
that the Ontario court may proceed with its consideration of what is best for his
welfare.
Id. at 153.
133 [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 695 (Can.), afT'd, [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 253, (discussed in
Bailey, supra note 123, at 303-04).
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she removed the child from Scotland to Canada. 3" According to
the Canadian Supreme Court "there had been a wrongful removal,
because the non-removal clause of the mother's interim custody
order preserved the jurisdiction in the Scottish court to determine
the issue of custody on the merits in a full hearing."'35 Because the
non-removal clause was placed in an interim custody order, the
Canadian court found the mother's breach of those custody rights
constituted a wrongful removal within the meaning of the
Convention.'36 In significant dicta, the court made clear, however,
that if the non-removal clause had been part of a permanent
custody order, the approach would not be the same because the
different issue of "ensur[ing] permanent access to the non-
custodial parent" would be raised.'37
Three years after Thomson, the Supreme Court of Canada
found a case to demonstrate that a permanent custody order would
have changed the outcome. In D.S. v. V.W.,13 the Canadian
Supreme Court overruled a lower court which cited C. v. C. for the
proposition that "access arrangements between the parties created
a custody right in the mother, in particular because there was an
implied agreement that the father would not remove the child
without the mother's consent."'39 The higher court ruled that there
was not a wrongful removal "within the meaning of the
Convention, because the father had a final custody order at the
time of the removal, and the mother had only [rights of] access."'4 °
114 Bailey, supra note 122, at 303.
135 Id. at 303-04.
136 Id. at 304.
137 Id. (quoting Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 253, 281 (Can.)).
Some commentators believe the court is suggesting that it would neither "consider an
access parent to have 'rights of custody' within the meaning of the Convention simply
because there is a non-removal clause in the custody order [nor find] that the Scottish
court... had 'rights of custody' if the mother's custody order and the non-removal
clause had been final." Id. at 304-05.
138 D.S. v. V.W., [19961 134 D.L.R.4th 481 (Can.) (discussed in Bailey, supra note
123, at 307-14).
139 Bailey, supra note 123, at 308-09.
140 Id. at 309. Further distinguishing V. W. from Thomson, the court "rejected the
argument that.., the Maryland court had 'rights of custody' because of the continuing
jurisdiction of the Maryland court to vary the custody order." Id. at 309-10. In addition,
no wrongful retention was found "because the ex parte custody order obtained by the
mother in Maryland after the removal did not confer on the mother 'rights of custody'
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The court further narrowed its interpretation of rights of
custody by suggesting that "[a]lthough D.S. v. V.W. involved an
implicit non-removal clause, . . . even an explicit non-removal
clause would not give the access parent 'rights of custody.""
41
IV. Analysis
The Second Circuit majority's decision in Croll'2 represents a
narrow interpretation of the protection of rights of access under the
Hague Convention.'43 This section analyzes the appellate court's
majority ruling in light of treaty interpretation principles and
perspectives of the dissent and other commentators.
As the Second Circuit majority explained, treaty interpretation,
like statutory interpretation, requires first a "look to its terms to
determine its meaning. ' '" 4 The treaty's text is then interpreted "in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.' 4 5
Because this is an international treaty, it is important to address the
extent to which the court's holding will affect Hague Convention
enforcement. Therefore, one must turn to the language, purpose,
and public policy considerations surrounding the Hague
Convention for a more complete understanding of the issue and its
implications. While the majority decision in Croll turned on its
interpretation of "rights of custody" under the Convention, 146 it is
necessary to balance all three principles of treaty interpretation so
as to render a decision in harmony with the Hague Convention's
that rendered the child's retention in Quebec wrongful." Id. at 310. Return of the child to
the father in Maryland was ordered. Id.
141 Id. at 311.
142 Croll 11, 229 F.3d at 134.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 136 (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 665, 663 (1992)
(treaties are construed in much the same manner as statutes) (citing Air France v. Saks,
470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985))).
145 Id.; see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)
(The clear import of treaty language controls unless "application of the words of the
treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or
expectations of its signatories."). Cf. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134
n.5 (1989) ("Even if the text were less clear, its most natural meaning could properly be
contradicted only by clear drafting history.").
146 Croll , 229 F.3d at 134.
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ideals.
A. The Hague Convention's Language: Defining "Rights of
Custody"
Because the Hague Convention draws a line between rights of
custody and rights of access, with only rights of custody accorded
the return remedy," 7 it is critical to examine the issue of whether
rights of access coupled with a non-removal clause is a right of
custody under the Hague Convention. The return remedy is only
available for wrongful removals or retentions that are "in breach of
rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution, or any other
body."'48 Therefore, as a first principle of Hague Convention
interpretation, understanding the expansive meaning of "custody"
is fundamental.
The court's majority found its definition of custody by using
several American dictionaries, stating that this ordinary meaning
was in harmony with the Hague Convention drafter's intention.'49
However, the Hague Convention itself defines rights of custody
and of access.'5° One commentator wrote that Article 5 creates "an
autonomous treaty definition of custody rights quite apart from
domestic law interpretations of custody, which may differ from
State to State."' 5' Because this is an international treaty, its
definitions must be flexible and broad enough to be used by all
signatories.'52
147 Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 3, 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4-5, 7-8,
1343 U.N.T.S at 98-99, 100.
148 Id. Those rights of custody also had to be "actually exercised, either jointly or
alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention." id. art. 3,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4-5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98-99.
149 Croll II, 229 F.3d at 138-39. In considering what the Hague Convention means
by the word "custody," the Croll majority cited Joyner v. Dumpson in which the Second
Circuit considered a definition of legal custody which "concerned ... the rights and
duties of the person (usually the parent) having custody to provide for the child's daily
needs-to feed him, clothe him, provide shelter, put him to bed, send him to school, see
that he washes his face and brushes his teeth." Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770, 778
(2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 827 n.17 (1977)).
150 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S.
at 99.
'5' Silberman, supra note 119, at 17.
152 See id.
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The Hague Convention definition of custody in Article 5 is
open-ended and separable. At common law, custody rights were
referred to as a bundle of rights that could be "fragmented and
shared between a number of persons, or between a person and an
institution.""' The majority's argument-that the right to
determine a child's place of residence through a non-removal
clause "falls short of conferring a joint right to determine the
child's residence"' 4 -clashes with the inclusive nature of the
Hague Convention definition. An early Hague Convention
commentator explained, "such rights, by whatever name they
might be called in a State's domestic legal system, are 'rights of
custody' for the purpose of the Convention and are protected by it.
There is nothing to suggest that such rights cannot be separated.""'
The dissent contends that the Hague Convention's "definition
of rights of custody contemplates a bundle of rights that are
protected regardless of whether a parent holds one, several or all
such custody rights, and whether the right or rights are held singly
or jointly with the other parent."'56 Some commentators agree,
concluding that in cases of non-removal orders, agreements or
laws, "the access parent does have a right of custody within the
meaning of the Convention."'' 7 Joint custody rights are an example
of separated rights of custody or access protected under the Hague
Convention' "which may assume a number of forms, including
situations in which one parent possesses sole physical custody of
the child but shares certain decision making authority with the
other parent. '  Hague Convention protection is recognized in
these cases when there are restrictions on the movement of the
custodial parent or where there are concepts of joint custody or
153 See Bailey, supra note 123, at 36; see also John Eekelaar, International Child
Abduction by Parents, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 281, 309-10 (1982).
'14 Croll II, 229 F.3d at 139.
'55 Bailey, supra note 123, at 36 (quoting John Eekelaar, supra note 153, at 309-10).
156 Croll II, 229 F.3d at 147 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
157 Bailey, supra note 123, at 37.
158 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4-5, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 98-99.
159 Several cases in both United States and foreign signatory courts have "provided
a gloss as to other types of parenting arrangements and custodial orders that create
custody rights." Silberman, supra note 119, at 17.
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guardianship. "
The following cases show that other courts recognize custody
rights being created in "other types of parenting arrangements and
custodial orders."'6 ' In the New York Family Court case of David
S. v. Zamira S.,' 62 the court found "that an order giving the non-
custodial parent visitation rights and restricting the custodial
parent from leaving the country constitutes an order granting
'custodial' rights to both parents under the Hague Convention.' 6 3
Similarly, in C. v. C.'64 the Court of Appeal in England held that
because of "an Australian decree [that] granted custody to the
mother and joint guardianship to both parents... the father had
custody rights within the meaning of the Convention.""'6 This was
because "the Australian guardianship order gave him the right to
prevent the child's removal from Australia without his
approval.'6 Then, the Israeli Supreme Court case of Pnina Turna
v. Daniel Charles Meshullam,'61 provided an example of a court
ruling that a mother's removal of a child from France was
wrongful and in violation of the joint custody she held with the
father and thus of his "rights of custody and ... visiting rights.' 68
Although the Hague Convention does not specifically define
rights of access, both subsections of Article 5 give clear
indications of drafter intent.' 69 Included in rights of access in
Subsection B is "the right to take a child for a limited period of
time to a place other than the child's habitual residence."'7
Subsection A particularly includes in rights of custody "the right
160 Bailey, supra note 123, at 37.
161 Id. (quoting Silberman, supra note 119, at 17).
162 Id. at 39 (citing David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991).
163 Id. (quoting Zamira, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 429).
1 W.L.R. 654 (C.A. 1989).
165 Silberman, supra note 119, at 18.
166 Id.
167 C.A. 1648/92, Pnina Turna v. Daniel Charles Meshullam (1992) (S. Ct. Isr.).
168 Id.
169 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S.
at 99.
170 Bailey, supra note 123, at 34 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99).
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to determine the child's place of residence."' 7' Commentators have
written that Subsection A refers to rights of access coupled with a
non-removal clause because "if the access parent has ... [the
right] 'to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other
than the child's habitual residence,' and shares the right to
determine the child's place of residence, then... [these are]
'rights of custody' within the meaning of the Convention."'
7 2
B. Hague Convention Object and Purpose
Understanding the Hague Convention's object and purpose
explains why protecting the rights of left-behind parents are
necessary to the effective operation of the Hague Convention. The
drafters of the Hague Convention declare: "[t]he objects of the
present Convention are ... to ensure that rights of custody and of
access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in other Contracting States."'' 3 A non-removal clause in
a custody order issued by one signatory country to a parent with
rights of access is meant to be "effectively respected" by another
signatory."' The majority recognized that implicit in the basic
premise of the Hague Convention is that "a child's country of
'habitual residence' is 'best placed to decide . . . questions of
custody and access."" 5 This is the reason why the remedy for
wrongful removal is to order the child "returned and any dispute
over custody ... litigated at the place of habitual residence.' ' 1 6 As
explained in the Perez-Vera Report, "the Convention rests
implicitly upon the principle that any debate on the merits of the
question, i.e., of custody rights, should take place before the
competent authorities in the State where the child had its habitual
residence prior to its removal.' 7  Those authorities will "be best
situated with information to determine the ultimate merits of any
'7' Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S.
at 99.
172 Bailey, supra note 123, at 35.
173 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 98.
174 Id.
'75 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 46, 34.
176 Silberman, supra note 119, at 11.
177 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 46, 19.
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custody controversy.""' 8 If children are not returned to left-behind
parents, then the wrongfully removing parent is not deterred from
"crossing international borders in search of a friendlier forum.' 79
The problem of forum shopping is the basic problem the drafters
sought to address. 8 ' Early official commentary said, "[such a
decision] bears a legal title sufficient to 'legalize' a factual
situation which none of the legal systems involved wished to see
brought about."'' Deterring parents by the recognition of non-
removal clauses in custody orders of other signatories carries out
the Hague Convention's basic premise.
C. Public Policy: The Effect of Not Granting Return
When interpreting a treaty with global effects, it is particularly
important to consider its larger ramifications. What could result
from the Second Circuit majority's decision not to grant a right of
return to left-behind parents holding a custody order with a non-
removal clause? As demonstrated by Section B of this analysis,
the premise of the Hague Convention is frustrated when the result
of a court decision is forum shopping. The passage of time
resulting from courts not honoring non-removal clauses by an
expeditious'82 return allows the wrongfully removing and retaining
parent to claim the "well-settled child" exception.'83
When that occurs, a "new and artificial status quo" is created
with "the passage of time.""'8 The longer the return is denied, the
more likely the parent will make a successful argument that "to
return the child following inordinate court delays or enforcement
delays could in some way damage the child's psychological
welfare."' 85 Courts in signatory countries that accept this argument
178 Bailey, supra note 123, at 41.
179 Id. at 41 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
4, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98).
180 Id. at 42 (quoting Perez-Vera Report, supra note 46, 15).
181 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 46, 15.
182 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 7, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 100 (defining "expeditious").
183 Id. art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 7-8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100.
184 Jan Rewers McMillan, Getting Them Back: The Disappointing Reality of Return
Orders Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 99, 103 (1997).
185 Id.
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can "completely obliterate the purpose, intent, and overall
objectives of the Convention."'8 6
A result of not recognizing child return for the left-behind
parent with rights of access and a non-removal clause is
inconsistent Hague Convention interpretation among the
signatories.'87 Because other signatory courts have recognized that
"agreements, orders or laws that prohibit a child's removal without
the access parent's consent create rights of custody,"' 8 fellow
signatories "should adopt the same interpretation, if possible, for
the sake of uniformity."'8 9 Despite the fact that courts have
autonomy in rendering their decisions,'9 ° and their determination of
whether the removal was wrongful must be "based on [their] own
interpretation of the Convention,"' 9' many signatory courts have
endeavored to "uniformly interpret the Convention.' 9 2 These
judges keep the international character of the Hague Convention in
mind because "the whole purpose of such a code is to produce a
situation in which the courts of all contracting states may be
expected to interpret and apply it in similar ways."'93 When
signatory courts interpret the Hague Convention with an eye to
uniformity, they thwart the basic problem the drafters were trying
to prevent: forum shopping by the wrongfully removing or
retaining parent. '
In looking at the case law of other signatories, the Second
Circuit majority saw "no consensus view emerge[] from the
opinions issued by the courts."'95 Because the court found "the
cases worldwide are few, scattered, conflicting, and sometimes
conclusory and unreasoned,"'96 it felt it was not bound to show
"deference to a series of conflicting cases from foreign
186 Id. at 104.
187 See Bailey, supra note 123, at 42.
181 Id. at 40.




193 Id. at 42-43 (quoting C. v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (1989) (Eng. C.A.)).
'94 Id. at 43.
195 Croll I, 229 F.3d at 143.
196 Id.
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signatories."'97 However, in looking at the same cases, the dissent
found that "most foreign courts addressing this question have
interpreted the notion of 'rights of custody' broadly in light of the
Convention's purpose and structure."'98
However, there are a few signatory courts... that have, like the
Second Circuit, "interpreted rights of custody, wrongful removal,
and wrongful retention more narrowly than courts in other
jurisdictions.' o These courts seem to interpret the Hague
Convention with a concern "for the mobility rights of custodial
parents.""°' The Second Circuit has now joined their minority.
V. Conclusion
The Second Circuit's narrow interpretation of the Hague
Convention does not balance the Hague Convention's definition of
custody with its overarching purpose of protecting children. By
placing exaggerated emphasis on its own definition of custody at
the expense of this purpose, the court came to a ruling that will
likely increase the chances that parents who wrongfully remove or
retain a child despite a non-removal clause in a custody order will
shop for a more sympathetic court or wait to take advantage of the
"well-settled child" exception. The Second Circuit's opinion is
inconsistent with the opinions of the majority of other signatory
courts. Hopefully, the court's holding will be restrictively applied
to lessen its impact on Hague Convention cases.
DEBORAH M. HUYNH
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19s Id. at 150; see C. v. C., supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text; Resina,
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201 Id. at 50.

